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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical situation: two employees work for
the same company, one located in Chicago, Illinois, and the other located in
St. Louis, Missouri; both employees perform the same job for the same
company except in two different locations.1 The two employees are
identical in every way: performance, education, and experience.2 Both of
the employees are injured while on the job and are now considered to have

1. See Kimberly Atkins, Lawyers Find ADA Circuit Split Hard to Accommodate,
DETROIT LEGAL NEWS (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/1373584
(expressing the difficulty that companies have complying with the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) given the circuit courts’ varied holdings regarding
reassignment).
2. See id. (highlighting the difficulties associated with applying incongruent
protections in different locations even though employees have equal standing under the
ADA).
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a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).3 Although
their employer tries diligently to accommodate the employees so that they
retain their current positions with the company, no accommodations are
sufficient to allow the employees to stay in their current positions.4
Because the employees with disabilities can no longer perform the essential
functions of their current positions, each of the employees expresses an
interest in being reassigned to vacant positions in the company.5 The
employee in Chicago is automatically placed in an administrative position
with comparable pay and similar benefits based on the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) ADA Enforcement Guidelines.6
However, the employee in St. Louis is forced to compete with other
applicants who apply for the vacant position.7 Although the employee in
St. Louis is qualified for the job, because another applicant is deemed more
qualified, the employee is not selected for the vacant position; the applicant
chosen to fill the vacant position does not have a disability, and instead of
risking the possibility of unemployment, the St. Louis employee takes a job
with the company that pays only half of her former wages.8
Due to a circuit split regarding the duty of employers to reassign
individuals with disabilities as a “reasonable accommodation,” this unequal
application of the statutory protections, that are afforded to individuals with
disabilities by the ADA, persists today.9 The Supreme Court’s failure to
3. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2009)
(defining a person with a “disability” as an individual having a physical or mental
“impairment” that substantially limits one or more “major life activities”).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2009) (requiring employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to individuals with disabilities, such as job restructuring and
modification of equipment or devices).
5. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(explaining that Congress and the EEOC view reassignment as a last resort when other
accommodations have failed).
6. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM., ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES
ACT
(2002),
available
at
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
accommodation.html [hereinafter U.S. EEOC] (requiring reassignment to vacant
positions with equivalent pay, benefits, and status).
7. See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 481 (8th Cir. 2007)
(illustrating the circuit courts’ disparate interpretations of the ADA’s reassignment
requirement).
8. See id. (simulating a possible outcome associated with requiring reassigned
employees to compete with other applicants for vacant positions).
9. See Howard S. Lavin & Elizabeth E. DiMichele, Split Circuits: To Reassign or
Not to Reassign, 36 EMPLOY. REL. L.J. 4, 4 (2011) (explaining that the conflict between
employers’ rights to institute non-discriminatory policies and employees’ reassignment
rights under the ADA remains unresolved).
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settle the circuit split within the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals means that
an employer’s reassignment duty, and subsequently accommodation
options for its employees with a disability vary based on the controlling
circuit’s interpretation of the ADA.10 The only difference between the two
employees from the hypothetical was the jurisdiction that governed their
respective rights under the ADA: Seventh Circuit precedent mandated the
Chicago employee’s non-competitive transfer, while the Eighth Circuit
permitted the employer to fulfill its ADA obligations by merely allowing
the St. Louis employee to compete with other applicants for the vacant
position.11 Although both of the employees with disabilities worked for the
same company and had equal rights under the ADA, the outcome was
different in each situation because the circuits differed in their
interpretation of the statute’s reassignment requirement.12 In US Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett, the Supreme Court offered a limited explanation of an
employer’s reassignment duty under the ADA when the duty conflicts with
a seniority hiring system; however, the statute’s effect on best-qualified
hiring policies remains unclear.13 The Supreme Court, in EEOC v. United
Airlines, Inc., had the chance to settle the circuits’ differing views
regarding the ADA’s effect on best-qualified hiring policies, but declined
to do so.14 It is unclear why the Supreme Court denied United Airlines’
application for a writ of certiorari, and the Court did not offer an
explanation.15 The Court’s denial is particularly puzzling given its
previous grant of certiorari in Huber v. Wal-Mart, which also presented the
question of whether preferential treatment is required under the ADA when
there is a non-discriminatory hiring policy in place.16

10. See id. (stating that the circuit split creates difficulty for employers that have
operations that span conflicting jurisdictions).
11. Compare EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (holding that the ADA mandates reassignment of
employees with disabilities to vacant positions), with Huber, 486 F.3d at 483 (holding
that the ADA does not trump a legitimate non-discriminatory hiring policy).
12. See Supreme Court Declines to Decide ADA Reassignment Question,
THOMPSON’S ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, (Thompson Info. Servs., Washington D.C.),
July 2013, at 1 [hereinafter THOMPSON’S] (noting that the Seventh, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits require preference while the other circuits do not require preference).
13. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 392 (2002) (holding that the
ADA does not trump the rights and benefits provided by legitimate seniority systems).
14. See generally United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 760.
15. See Cathleen Flahardy, Supreme Court Won’t Hear United-ADA
Accommodations
Case,
INSIDE
COUNSEL
(May
29,
2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/05/29/supreme-court-wont-hear-united-adaaccommodations (speculating that the Court favors the Seventh Circuit’s decision).
16. See Ellen Girard Giorgiadis, Labor: Disabled Employees Have a Leg Up for
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This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should have granted
certiorari in EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc. and ruled that employers are
required to reassign minimally qualified employees with disabilities to
vacant positions as a “reasonable accommodation” despite the existence of
an employer’s policy dictating that the best-qualified candidate be hired.17
Part II of this Comment discusses the current circuit split regarding whether
the ADA’s definition of “reasonable accommodation” requires an employer
to reassign eligible employees to vacant positions or only requires an
employer to grant eligible employees the opportunity to compete for such
positions.18 Part III argues that the ADA generally requires mandatory
reassignment of eligible employees regardless of the existence of a nondiscriminatory best-qualified hiring policy because reassignment will
ordinarily be reasonable, based on the two-step analysis the Supreme Court
established in Barnett.19 Part III further argues that requiring noncompetitive reassignment is proper because allowing the ADA to trump a
best-qualified hiring policy does not infringe on the rights of competing
applicants or employers the same way subordinating a seniority system
would have in Barnett.20 Part IV argues that subordination of an
employer’s best-qualified hiring policy in favor of reassignment advances
the aims of the ADA.21 Part V concludes that the Supreme Court should
have granted certiorari in EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., and ruled that the
ADA reassignment requirement mandates non-competitive placement of an
Reassignment to Vacant Positions in Certain States, INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 25, 2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/03/25/labor-disabled-employees-have-a-leg-up-for
-reassig (explaining the employment bar’s hope that the Supreme Court will remedy the
split).
17. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693
F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (arguing that the ADA
requires an employer to reassign individuals with disabilities to vacant positions when
doing so would not cause the employer undue hardship).
18. See infra Part II (explaining the divergent interpretations of the ADA’s
language by the circuit courts and the resulting duties imposed on employers in the
respective jurisdictions).
19. See infra Part III (arguing that under the Supreme Court’s analysis of seniority
systems in Barnett, requests for reassignment that conflict with a best-qualified hiring
policy are ordinarily reasonable and thus generally mandate non-competitive
placement).
20. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (explaining that all
accommodations require preferential treatment); see also McWright v. Alexander, 982
F.2d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that requiring an employer to change its policies
to accommodate individuals with a disability is at the heart of the ADA).
21. See infra Part IV (highlighting the additional social and legal benefits of
Supreme Court guidance beyond establishing consistent mandates for employers and
employees).
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employee with a disability into a vacant position, even if the placement
circumvents the employer’s best-qualified hiring policy.22
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act,
acknowledging the widespread discrimination affecting individuals with
disabilities, and establishing a national mandate for the elimination of such
discrimination.23 Among other things, the purpose of the Act was to
provide definitive and enforceable standards that would address
discrimination against Americans with disabilities.24 The ADA specifically
defines what actions an employer must take to prevent discrimination
against individuals with disabilities and what inactions by an employer
In
constitute discrimination against individuals with disabilities.25
particular, the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against
individuals based on their disability with regard to various employment
procedures.26 The ADA states that an employer discriminates against an
employee with a disability if the employer fails to provide the employee
with “reasonable accommodation” for the employee’s physical or mental
limitations, unless providing the accommodation would cause an undue
hardship on the employer.27 If an employer is unable to accommodate an
employee’s disability, such that the employee can remain in her current
position, the ADA states that a reasonable accommodation may include
reassignment of the employee to a vacant position.28 The ADA only
22. See infra Part V (concluding that Supreme Court review of EEOC v. United
Airlines, Inc. was necessary for the equal administration of justice under the ADA).
23. See generally Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(2009) (noting Congress’ finding that disability discrimination persists in numerous
critical areas of life, including employment).
24. See § 12101(b)(2) (stating that the ADA’s purpose was the creation and
enforcement of clear, strong, and consistent standards to address disability
discrimination).
25. See § 12112 (defining which actions are prohibited and/or mandated by the
ADA to eliminate disability discrimination).
26. See § 12112(a) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against job
applicants with a disability and current employees with regard to application
procedures, hiring, promotion, and firing).
27. See, e.g., § 12112(b)(5)(A) (mandating that employers take affirmative steps to
eliminate discrimination against employees with a disability unless that action would
create undue burden on the employer).
28. See § 12111(9)(B) (defining the term “reasonable accommodation” to include
reassignment to a vacant position when necessary).
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requires employees to reassign “qualified” employees with disabilities to a
Since its enactment, the ADA’s “reasonable
vacant position.29
accommodations” requirement has perplexed employees and employers.30
The ADA’s vague language has led to many unresolved issues as
employers, employees, and courts have interpreted the ambiguous terms of
the statute in different ways.31
B. There Is Currently a Circuit Split Regarding Whether Reassignment of a
Qualified Employee is a Reasonable Accommodation Within the Meaning
of the ADA.
Circuit courts have added to the confusion regarding the ADA’s
language by interpreting its reassignment requirement in two different
ways. Currently, some circuits require non-competitive reassignment to
vacant positions, while other circuits permit employers to require
applicants with disabilities to compete with other applicants for vacant
positions.32
1. Three Circuit Courts Agree That the ADA Mandates Reassignment of
Eligible Employees to Vacant Positions.
Three circuit courts, along with the EEOC, have held that under the
ADA, an employer’s obligation to reassign qualified employees with a
disability to vacant positions as a reasonable accommodation entails more
than simply allowing the employees to compete with other applicants for
the vacant position.33 The most current opinion on the issue comes from
the Seventh Circuit, which held that the ADA requires that an employer
reassign individuals with a disability to vacant positions, for which they are
qualified, if such accommodations would be reasonable and would not
impose an undue hardship on the employer.34 Reversing one of its previous
29. See § 12111(8) (defining a “qualified” employee as one who can perform the
essential functions of the vacant position with or without reasonable accommodations).
30. See, e.g., L. Lynnette Fuller, The ADA’s Reasonable Accommodation
Requirement Ten Years Later, POPULAR GOVERNMENT, at 18 (2000) (noting that the
ADA, although successful in granting civil rights protections, was misunderstood by
many individuals).
31. See id. (attributing some of the confusion surrounding the ADA to the statute’s
use of terms of art such as “major life activity,” “essential job functions,” and
“reasonable accommodation”).
32. See THOMPSON’S, supra note 12 (explaining the respective positions of the
Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding whether the ADA mandates preferential treatment
when reassigning qualified employees).
33. See id. (describing one interpretation of the ADA’s reassignment obligation).
34. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (holding that the ADA requires employers to provide
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decisions, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Supreme Court’s rationale in
Barnett, recognizing the necessity of preferences for individuals with a
disability as a means of achieving the ADA’s objectives.35 Similarly, the
Tenth Circuit interpreted the language of the ADA to require more than just
consideration of the qualified individual with a disability for a vacant
position along with other applicants.36 The court reasoned that if the ADA
only required employers to allow employees a disability to apply for vacant
positions, the employee is not actually being “reassigned,” and thus parts of
the ADA’s language would be superfluous.37 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit also interpreted the ADA’s language to confer an
obligation on employers to do more than allow employees with a disability
to apply for vacant positions; the court indicated that any other
interpretation would weaken the effectiveness of the statute.38 Moreover,
the court reasoned that merely requiring an employer to permit employees
with a disability to apply to vacant positions would render some of the
statute’s language superfluous.39 The EEOC, charged with the enforcement
of Title I of the ADA, also interpreted the statute as requiring employers to
place qualified employees with a disability into the vacant position without
forcing them to compete with other applicants.40 The EEOC set forth its
Enforcement Guidance resource in 2002, after Barnett, to advise employers
and employees about their legal rights and obligations under the ADA.41

employees with a disability with preferential treatment when reassigning employees
with a disability as long as it does not place an undue hardship on the employer).
35. Compare EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir.
2000) (finding that mandatory preferential treatment is inconsistent with the ADA’s
aims and creates an undue burden), with U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,
397 (2002) (stating that any accommodation requires preferential treatment and
indicating that such preferences are vital to achieving the ADA’s goals).
36. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the interpretation that the ADA only calls for competitive consideration of
individuals with a disability).
37. See id. at 1165 (interpreting the ADA to allow preferences).
38. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating
that mere consideration of qualified employees for vacancies is not consistent with the
ADA).
39. See id. (rejecting an interpretation of the statute that nullifies specific
provisions (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994) (stating that
judges should hesitate to treat statutory provisions as mere excess language)).
40. See U.S. EEOC, supra note 6 (explaining that a qualified employee is not
required to compete and instead, should be appointed to the new position).
41. See id. (using its capacity as an administrative agency to assist employers
seeking to ensure compliance with the ADA).
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2. Other Circuits Have Held That the ADA Only Requires Employers to
Give Eligible Employees the Opportunity to Compete for Vacant Positions.
Courts of Appeals in six of the circuits have held that the ADA does not
guarantee eligible employees reassignment to a vacant position and that the
ADA was not intended to provide an affirmative preference for such
employees.42 The most notable and recent decision came from the Eighth
Circuit in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., where the court limited an
employers’ duty to reassign individuals with a disability.43 Reinforcing an
opinion it expressed prior to Barnett, the Eighth Circuit held that the ADA
does not mandate that an employer reassign an employee with a disability
to a vacant position if doing so would circumvent an employer’s bestqualified hiring policy.44 Although some of the circuits’ decisions
preceded Barnett and do not address the statute’s conflict with nondiscriminatory employment policies, other circuits have interpreted the
ADA to provide equal employment opportunities for qualified individuals
with a disability and nothing more.45 Additionally, the Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits construed the ADA’s provisions as only requiring
employers to place employees with a disability on an even playing field
with other applicants, and not provide preferential treatment.46 The courts
that have held that preferential treatment of employees with a disability is
inconsistent with the ADA have justified their position using congressional
intent behind passage of the ADA and a strict interpretation of the ADA’s
reassignment language.47 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit found that the
42. See THOMPSON’S, supra note 12 (noting that six circuit courts reject the idea
that the ADA demands noncompetitive reassignment).
43. See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 481 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding
the employer’s neutral policy sufficient to overcome ADA reassignment in a case
involving a grocer who suffered a permanent arm injury and requested reassignment to
a router position).
44. See Kellogg v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 233 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (finding that employers are not required to pass over more qualified applicants
to accommodate an employee with a disability); see also Huber, 486 F.3d at 483
(holding that the ADA is not a mandatory preference act).
45. See Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384-85 (2d Cir.
1996) (finding that the ADA only requires equal treatment); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp.,
237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that requiring preferential treatment is
inconsistent with the ADA).
46. See Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 457 (6th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that the ADA does not require employers to grant preferences); Terrell v.
USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Congress’ intent to exclude
preferences); Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) (stating that the ADA does not require favoring individuals with a
disability).
47. See Wernick, 91 F.3d at 384 (stating that, through passage of the ADA,
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ADA was not intended to trump the rights of employers and other
employees, whether or not those rights were bargained for in a collective
agreement.48 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit found that the ADA merely
requires the prevention of disability discrimination.49
3. The Supreme Court’s Limited Guidance Regarding the Reassignment
Obligation that the ADA Places on Employers Failed to Resolve the Circuit
Split and Has Been Interpreted Differently by Lower Courts.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA’s reassignment
obligation in relation to an existing seniority-based hiring system provided
some guidance regarding reassignment of employees with a disability in a
best-qualified system.50 In Barnett, an employee with a disability alleged a
violation of the ADA because the position that he requested to be
transferred to was awarded to a more senior employee as required by the
employer’s seniority based hiring system.51 The Court found that the mere
existence of a seniority system was generally sufficient to trump an
employee’s ADA request because of the loss of benefits and other
difficulties that may result from circumvention of the seniority system.
However, the Court indicated that an employee may prove that an
exception to the seniority system is proper under certain circumstances.52
In Shapiro v. Township of Lakewood, the Third Circuit explained the twopronged analysis of reassignment requests set forth by the Barnett Court.53
In Shapiro, an employee with a disability requested reassignment to a
vacant position as a reasonable accommodation, but the request was denied
when the town refused to reassign the employee without following the
standard interdepartmental transfer procedures.54 The Court of Appeals
Congress only intended to create equal employment opportunities).
48. See Kellogg, 233 F.3d at 1089 (finding that the ADA does not require an
employer to subvert the rights of others).
49. See Turco, 101 F.3d at 1094 (interpreting the statute to merely prohibit
discrimination against individuals with disabilities).
50. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400-01 (2002) (noting that the
ADA will sometimes require affirmative action, but only in situations where the action
would not cause disruption to the employer’s business operations).
51. See id. at 394-95 (alleging that his employer discriminated against him by
refusing to make his transfer permanent).
52. See id. at 392 (stating that Congress did not intend to undermine the operation
of seniority-based systems).
53. See 292 F.3d 356, 360-61 (3d. Cir. 2002) (explaining that Barnett first requires
the employee to show a feasible reassignment, and then employers must prove undue
hardship).
54. See id. at 357 (requiring individuals seeking transfer to visit the municipal
building and review posted announcements).
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found that because the employee identified positions that he was qualified
for, summary judgment was improper even though reassignment would
have circumvented the interdepartmental transfer procedure, a nondiscriminatory policy.55
Lower courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s Barnett analysis in
multiple ways, both supporting and rejecting the subordination of bestqualified hiring policies.56 As the Eighth Circuit does now, the Seventh
Circuit originally interpreted Barnett to support its previous interpretation
of the ADA as set forth in EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.57 In HumistonKeeling, the Seventh Circuit held that employers are not required to
contravene non-discriminatory policies in order to provide reasonable
accommodations to individuals with a disability. Requiring employers to
do so would convert the ADA into a mandatory preference statute.58
However, years later, in United Airlines, upon en banc review, the court
overturned Humiston-Keeling based on recognition of the significant
differences between seniority-based and best-qualified hiring systems.59 In
Mays, a nurse appealed a grant of summary judgment, under the
Rehabilitation Act, against her claims that her employer failed to reassign
her to an administrative position for which she was qualified.60 Instead of
assigning her to the administrative position, the hospital had assigned her to
a clerical position that provided her with the same net salary but fewer
career advantages and fringe benefits.61 The court found that the presence

55. See id. (holding that the employee with a disability’s request for
accommodation through reassignment to vacant positions for which he qualified was
sufficient to defeat the employer’s motion for summary judgment).
56. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
employers do not violate the ADA by hiring better-qualified applicants over individuals
with a disability requesting reassignment). But see EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693
F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (stating that the
court was wrong to equate best-qualified policies and seniority-based policies because
of the differing provisions of such policies).
57. See 227 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that requiring an
employer to turn away a superior applicant was inconsistent with the ADA and placed
an unreasonable burden on employers).
58. See id. at 1028 (stating that a best-qualified hiring policy is an example of a
legitimate non-discriminatory policy).
59. See United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764 (admitting that the Mays court
disregarded the fact-specific analysis in Barnett’s holding, treating all nondiscriminatory policies the same).
60. See Mays, 301 F.3d at 868 (claiming that her employer failed to make a proper
accommodation by assigning her to a clerical position that paid a lower salary).
61. See id. at 872 (finding that the hospital was not required to provide an ideal
accommodation, only a reasonable one).
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of seniority systems and best-qualified systems alone are equally sufficient
to outweigh reassignment duties as placing an unreasonable hardship on the
employer under the rationale in Barnett.62
Courts have even misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s analysis of
whether circumvention of a non-discriminatory policy is reasonable.63 In
Haynes v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, a customer service representative with a
disability requested that he be transferred from his current call center
position to a retail job, as a reasonable accommodation for his disability.64
After applying for various other positions but receiving no offers, the
customer service representative was placed on leave and eventually
terminated.65 Following AT&T’s termination of the employee, he brought
suit, claiming that the company discriminated against him by refusing his
request for a reassignment.66 The court overruled the magistrate judge’s
ruling, placing the burden on the employee to show that the reassignment
was reasonable and that there was no undue hardship placed on the
employer by the reassignment request, despite the presence of a nondiscriminatory hiring policy.67 The Haynes Court’s ruling collapses the
shifting burdens in a reassignment analysis into one burden and places it on
the employee. The Supreme Court, in Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.,
clarified that the ultimate finding of reasonableness depends on shifting
burdens of production.68

62. See id. (stating that employers are not required to overlook superior
candidates).
63. See Haynes v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:09-CV-450, 2011 WL 532218, at
*4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2011) (considering the company’s best-qualified system when
evaluating the plaintiff’s showing of a feasible reassignment, instead of requiring the
employer to prove that circumvention of the system constitutes undue hardship).
64. See id. at *1 (noting the customer service representative’s physician’s
recommendation that he be reassigned to a less stressful position).
65. See id. (illustrating the parties’ failure to reach a reasonable accommodation
through the ADA’s interactive process).
66. See id. at *2 (alleging disability discrimination after previous attempts to
accommodate his disability failed).
67. See id. at *3 (stating that the correct test was whether the employee could show
that reassignment was reasonable, over a more qualified applicant, under the bestqualified employment system).
68. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995)
(finding that an employee who identifies a plausible accommodation shows a prima
facie reasonable accommodation and discussing the employer’s burden to show that it
creates an undue hardship emerges).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss3/4

12

Conway: Ordinarily Reasonable: Using the Supreme Court's Barnett Analysis

2014]

ORDINARILY REASONABLE

733

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Should Find That the ADA’s Reassignment
Requirement Outweighs the Presence of Best-Qualified Hiring Policies.
The Supreme Court should have granted United Airlines, Inc.’s petition
for a writ of certiorari and found that circumvention of an employer’s bestqualified hiring policy alone is not sufficient to trump the reassignment
obligation that the ADA places on employers.69 An employer is required to
grant an individual with a disability’s requested accommodation even
though it conflicts with a disability-neutral policy if it is reasonable,
considering analogous case law, and does not impose an undue hardship on
the employer.70 An employee with a disability’s request for reassignment
to a vacant position is not unreasonable simply because the request
conflicts with a non-discriminatory employment policy; rather, the
presence of a non-discriminatory employment policy is only one factor in
the overall reasonableness analysis.71 Furthermore, reassignment is
reasonable when the employee with a disability identifies a vacant position
for which he or she is qualified; after that, the employer has the burden of
proving that the requested reassignment imposes an undue hardship upon
the employer.72
Employees seeking reassignment will usually be able to satisfy the first
prong of the Barnett analysis notwithstanding the existence of a bestqualified hiring policy.73 Employers’ regular practice of hiring the most
qualified applicant for a position does not affect whether a position is
vacant or whether an employee is qualified for that position.74 Employees

69. See United Airlines, Inc. v. EEOC, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (mem.) (denying
petitioner’s writ of certiorari); see also THOMPSON’S, supra note 12, at 1 (noting the
Court’s refusal to hear the issue even after they granted certiorari in a similar 2008
case).
70. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002) (finding that
the employee need only show that reassignment is feasible, and then the employer may
show that the reassignment inflicts an undue burden on the employer); Shapiro v. Twp.
of Lakewood, 292 F.3d 356, 361 (3d. Cir. 2002) (explaining the two-step test the Court
created in Barnett to evaluate a reasonable accommodation that trumps a nondiscriminatory rule).
71. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397 (holding that the existence of an employer’s nondiscriminatory policy alone does not trump the ADA).
72. See Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1022 (8th Cir. 2000)
(finding reassignment reasonable where the employee finds a vacant position for which
they are qualified).
73. See id. at 1020 (finding that the employee, who identified three positions to
which she could have been reassigned, established an issue of fact).
74. See Shapiro, 292 F.3d at 360 (finding that in ADA failure-to-transfer actions,
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need only be able to perform the essential functions of the requested
position, as defined by the employer within reasonable limits.75
Similarly, the Barnett Court indicated that the employee with a disability
who is seeking reassignment need only show that the accommodation
seems reasonable on its face to satisfy her initial burden.76 Although the
Court ultimately determined that the requested reassignment in Barnett was
unreasonable, the Court found that the employee satisfied the first-prong of
the reasonable accommodation inquiry.77 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
argued that only a legally enforceable seniority-based hiring policy would
impact an employee’s ability to meet her initial burden of showing that a
feasible reassignment existed.78 Given that a best-qualified policy does not
create the same type of entitlement to the vacant position by other
employees as a seniority-based policy, best-qualified hiring policies do not
The Court reiterated its
affect the vacancy in the same way.79
determination that the existence of a non-discriminatory policy is not
dispositive by allowing the employee to show that reassignment does not
impose an undue hardship on the employer because the non-discriminatory
policy is not routinely enforced or contains so many exceptions that it does
not create an enforceable expectation by other employees.80 The existence
of a best-qualified hiring policy is most influential to the reasonableness of
a requested reassignment under the second-prong of the Barnett analysis,
where the employer is required to counter the employee’s claim by proving
the employee’s initial burden is to prove that they identified a vacant position for which
they were qualified).
75. See Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004)
(stating that courts defer to the employer’s judgment when deciding the essential
functions of a job unless the functions are inconsistently enforced or unrelated to
business necessities).
76. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401 (explaining the employee’s burden of proof when
seeking reassignment under the ADA); see also Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.,
63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that simply suggesting a facially costeffective reassignment satisfies an employee’s initial burden to identify a reasonable
accommodation).
77. See Barnett, 533 U.S. at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that Barnett met
his burden for reassignment by identifying a plausible accommodation).
78. See id. at 409 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that a position cannot be
considered vacant if another employee is entitled to it under a non-discriminatory
policy that is currently in place).
79. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (finding that a best-qualified system does not involve
the same property rights as a seniority-based system).
80. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405-06 (granting employees the possibility of
achieving a reasonable accommodation for their disability despite the existence of a
non-discriminatory employment policy preventing such accommodation).
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that reassignment imposes an undue hardship on the employer.81
B. Unlike a Seniority System, Reassignment in a Best-Qualified System
Does Not Subordinate Applicants’ Legitimate Interests.
Reassignment is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, even
where the company uses a best-qualified system, because it does not
subordinate the vested interest of other employees as it does in a senioritybased system.82 The Supreme Court in Barnett analyzed the various
purposes of a seniority system to decide whether reassignment sufficiently
outweighs the benefits and expectations that a seniority system provides to
employers and employees.83 Many of the advantages and possible
difficulties the Court considered, such as job security and predictable
advancement, do not support the imposition of a best-qualified system over
ADA reassignment obligations.84 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s
recent decision in United Airlines, abrogating Mays v. Principi, asserts that
ADA accommodations should withstand a claim of undue hardship based
solely on the existence of a best-qualified policy.85 The Seventh Circuit
found that the nurse had been adequately accommodated, but even if the
employer awarded the position to a more qualified applicant, the hospital
would have been in compliance with the ADA because a seniority system
or best-qualified system are equally sufficient to outweigh reassignment
duties as imposing an unreasonable hardship on the employer under
Barnett’s rationale.86
The application of the Court’s analysis of seniority systems in Barnett to
best-qualified hiring policies fails to justify subordinating ADA
81. See Shapiro v. Twp. of Lakewood, 292 F.3d. 356, 361 (3d. Cir. 2002)
(explaining the shifting burdens the Court must analyze when considering a requested
accommodation’s reasonableness).
82. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 392 (finding that employees’ interests in a seniority
system usually prevail over ADA interests).
83. See id. at 404-05 (considering the advantages and difficulties that would result
from subverting a company’s seniority policy).
84. See id. (finding that the seniority system provides predictability in layoffs,
advancement, and limits unfairness).
85. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
employers do not violate the ADA by hiring better-qualified applicants over individuals
with a disability requesting reassignment). But see EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693
F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (stating that the
court was wrong to equate best-qualified policies with seniority policies because of the
differing rights and administrative concerns associated with each type of policy).
86. See Mays, 301 F.3d at 872 (reasoning that if employers are not required to
grant seniority to justify reassignment in a seniority system, then they are not required
to overlook inferior qualifications in a best-qualified system).
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obligations.87 Unlike seniority systems, allowing reassignment to trump
best-qualified hiring policies does not violate expectations regarding job
security.88 The Supreme Court stated that this is the most significant
benefit conferred by the seniority system; however it has no bearing on
applicants’ or employees’ expectations in a best-qualified system.89 Even
if an employee does rely on the existence of a company best-qualified
hiring policy, her reliance is not as clearly defined as it would be in a
seniority system and therefore is not entitled to the same deference.90 The
Barnett Court also stated that a seniority system, notwithstanding special
circumstances pleaded by the employer, should be sufficient to show undue
hardship given that any deviation from it would undermine other employee
expectations.91 This supposed benefit of a non-discriminatory policy is not
transferable to the best-qualified hiring policy that many employers evoke
to withstand ADA requirements.92 Unlike a seniority system, where an
employee’s entitlement to the position over another similarly qualified
applicant is objectively measured, the employer discretion inherent to bestqualified systems tempers employee expectations.93 Seniority systems
contain an objective threshold level of qualifications that applicants must
meet whereupon their finite seniority levels then become the deciding
factor of who gets the position.94 Best-qualified systems also have an
87. See Jared Hager, Bowling for Certainty: Picking Up the Seven-Ten Split by
Pinning Down the Reasonableness of Reassignment After Barnett, 87 MINN. L. REV.
2063, 2086 (2003) (finding the court’s analysis in Barnett useful in applying ADA
obligations to other non-discriminatory employment policies).
88. See id. at 2092 (explaining that an external applicant for a vacant position,
having never occupied a position with the company, has no expectation of job security
resulting from the company’s implementation of the best-qualified policy).
89. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404-05 (affirming the use of seniority systems to
determine layoffs).
90. See United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764 (finding that reassignment trumps the
existence of a best-qualified system because its imposition would not violate property
rights or other company concerns).
91. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404-05 (finding that because employees rely on their
status in the seniority system to predict equal treatment, the system should not be
overcome by the ADA’s reassignment provisions).
92. See Hager, supra note 87, at 2092 (finding that reassigning an individual with
a disability over an external applicant does not violate any legitimate expectations).
93. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641 n.17 (1987) (commenting
that the final hiring decision of choosing the best-qualified applicant will always
involve some subjectivity (citing Brief for the Am. Soc’y for Pers. Admin. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (No.
85-1129) 1986 WL 728160, at *9)).
94. See Cal. Brewers Ass’n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605-06 (1980) (defining a
seniority system as a scheme that determines transfers and promotions by a mix of
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objective minimal qualifications level.95 After applicants meet that
threshold level, company personnel decide who is better, based on many
factors.96 Because there are many possibilities that would justify a
company’s hiring of one person over another, when both meet the
minimum threshold, there is less of a workplace disruption where
reassignment trumps a best-qualified hiring system than in a seniority
system.97 The discretion in a best-qualified system permits the selection of
an individual who seems less qualified, when judging only on the objective
job criteria, where a seniority system would not allow a less senior
applicant to obtain the position after both meet the minimum criteria.98
Therefore, such a selection would not undermine the function of a bestqualified system such that it would constitute undue hardship; however,
circumvention of a seniority policy produces a much more substantive
change in the way the company functions and may be enough to trump the
ADA.99 The Fourth Circuit agrees with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation
of Barnett’s application to best-qualified systems.100 The Kosakoski Court
rejected the company’s reliance on Huber, which followed the now
seniority and other factors such as aptitude tests).
95. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2009)
(requiring an employee to be capable of performing the essential functions of the
vacant position before they are qualified for reassignment).
96. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641 n.17 (finding it rare that one applicant is the most
qualified of the field of applicants, giving that applicant a legitimate expectation to be
hired over others (citing Brief for the Am. Soc’y for Pers. Admin. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (No. 851129) 1986 WL 728160, at *9)).
97. Compare Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding reassignment improper because it would disrupt the collective bargaining
agreement between employees and the employer), with EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc.,
693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (stating that
allowing reassignment to trump a best-qualified policy would not result in similar
burdens or administrative concerns).
98. See Hager, supra note 87, at 2092 (explaining that unlike an objective seniority
system, identifying the best-qualified applicant may require subjective evaluation of the
applicant).
99. Compare Matheson v. Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 587
S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (upholding the promotion of a less qualified
applicant, based on civil service examination scores, in the interest of the police
department), with Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that subordinating a seniority system may constitute an alteration in the
nature of the employer’s business).
100. See Kosakoski v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 12-cv-00038, 2013 WL
5377863, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2013) (agreeing that a company’s best-qualified
hiring policy does not create a per se undue hardship sufficient to trump ADA
mandates).
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reversed Humiston-Keeling without further analysis.101
C. Unlike Barnett, Applicants Are Not Entitled to the Vacant Position as a
Result of Investment in the Best-Qualified System.
Reassignment that circumvents an employer’s best-qualified hiring
policy does not deprive applicants of vested interests.102 Although the
Barnett Court found that the seniority system encourages employees to
invest in their employer’s company, this investment is non-existent when
considering a reassigned employee and an outside applicant for a position
in a best-qualified scenario.103 The Seventh Circuit differentiates the two
employment systems and their respective effects on reassignment under the
ADA.104 The Seventh Circuit has expressly found that best-qualified
employment policies are not identical to seniority systems because the
systems entail different employee rights and expectations.105
Further, the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation that reassignment is
unreasonable if it conflicts with the operation of any non-discriminatory
policy is over-expansive and inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s factspecific analysis requirement.106 Because reassignment requests that
conflict with neutral employment policies do not render reassignment per
se unreasonable, companies with established best-qualified systems are not
entitled to summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in failure-totransfer suits under the ADA.107

101. See id. at *16 (noting that similar case law no longer supports the
subordination of reassignment based solely on the existence of a best-qualified system).
102. See United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d at 764 (explaining that allowing
reassignment to trump a best-qualified policy does not involve the property rights,
administrative concerns, or company disruption that results from subordinating a
seniority system).
103. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404 (2002) (stating that
employees sacrifice their value in order to earn greater benefits in the future).
104. See id. (specifying that in a seniority system, employees are already entitled to
a particular position based on their tenure at the company); see also id. at 408
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that only enforceable systems trump the ADA).
105. See United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764 (finding that the Mays Court erroneously
equated seniority and best-qualified systems).
106. Compare Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir.
2000) (finding that reassignment does not usually trump established non-discriminatory
policies), with Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397 (holding that an employer’s disability-neutral
rule cannot by itself supplant its reassignment duty).
107. See United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 761 (differentiating the statute’s conflict with
best-qualified and seniority employment policies).
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D. The Subjectivity of Employers’ Best-Qualified System Undermines an
Applicant’s Legitimate Expectation of Being Hired Over an Otherwise
Qualified Applicant with a Disability Requesting Reassignment.
The managerial discretion inherent in best-qualified hiring policies
precludes an applicant’s legitimate expectations of being hired over an
otherwise qualified individual; thus, ADA reassignment interests trump the
operational interest justifying the rule, and reassignment is ordinarily
reasonable.108 The Supreme Court ultimately decided that a company’s
seniority system would ordinarily trump ADA reassignment obligations
because Congress did not intend to overcome employees’ legitimate
expectations under the system’s provisions.109 Unlike seniority systems,
employer’s best-qualified hiring systems do not offer the same objectively
measured expectations that the Court protected in Barnett.110 An
employer’s diversity interests, as well as other immeasurable subjective
qualities, may undermine an applicant’s expectation to be hired in a bestqualified system.111 These immeasurable qualities become more relevant
given that, in the private sector, service-producing industries have the
largest number of employers that recruit individuals with disabilities.112 An
employer’s preference for an individual possessing less experience or
education for a particular position, in light of the applicant’s status as a
person with a disability and relevant immeasurable characteristics, would
not be uncommon or unfair in a best-qualified system.113

108. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 978-79 (1988) (stating
that hiring policies that have both objective and subjective criteria should be considered
subjective); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641 n.17 (1987) (stating that
hiring decisions in best-qualified systems are subjective).
109. See Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048 n.11 (7th Cir. 1996)
(expressing that seniority systems are used to “compute” benefits earned by an
employee while working at a particular company).
110. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394 (permitting summary judgment where requested
accommodations conflict with seniority systems).
111. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 991 (explaining that qualities like common sense,
originality, and ambition may contribute to success at many jobs but are not objectively
measurable).
112. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, OFF. OF DISABILITY EMP’T POL’Y, SURVEY OF
EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, TECH.
REP., 2 (2008) [hereinafter SURVEY OF EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES] (reporting that
private industries such as retail, transportation, and hospitality have the largest number
of employers that recruit individuals with disabilities).
113. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641 n.17 (agreeing that there is rarely a single bestqualified applicant, and that for jobs that do not require unique experience, the decision
as to what applicant is “best-qualified” is subjective).
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E. Mandating Non-Competitive Reassignment Under the ADA Would Not
Unjustly Discriminate Against Applicants Without a Disability.
Employers are free to grant preferences based on attributes other than
merit, such as race and sex, through affirmative action plans created to
accomplish legitimate diversity goals.114 Thus, mandating reassignment
under the ADA would not create undue hardship through reverse disability
discrimination litigation by competing applicants without a disability.115
Mandating non-competitive reassignment of qualified individuals with a
disability to vacant positions, in furtherance of ADA objectives, would not
unduly discriminate against applicants without a disability.116 The
Supreme Court has upheld measures taken by private entities that are
consistent with congressional statutory goals and intended to correct
historical discrimination.117 In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the
Court found that the agency properly considered the female applicant’s
minority status as a factor in improving the representation of minorities in
the workforce as consistent with Title VII.118
Similarly, an employer’s consideration of an employee’s status as a
person with a disability under the ADA would be proper in order to comply
with the ADA and combat the widespread disability discrimination that
continues to plague American workers.119 Given that the individual with a
disability seeking reassignment must satisfy other ADA criteria,
considering her disability to achieve diversity in the workplace along with
other objective job criteria would not unjustly discriminate against

114. See id. at 616-17 (finding the agency’s consideration of applicants’ sex
justified by the existence of an underrepresentation of women in segregated job
categories).
115. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (2008)
(stating specifically that the ADA does not provide a cause of action for discrimination
based on an individual’s lack of a disability); see also Carrier v. Paige, 159 F.3d 1357
(5th Cir. 1998) (depublished) (stating that the ADA’s language does not support a
claim for reverse disability discrimination).
116. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630 (finding no improper discrimination partly
because voluntary employer action can play a role in furthering the aims of Title VII).
117. See id. at 617 (finding the company’s attempt to improve the representation of
minorities consistent with Title VII).
118. See id. at 641-42 (finding that because the agency’s affirmative action plan
was moderate, flexible, and considered applicants on a case-by-case basis, the plan was
consistent with Title VII and helped eliminate historical sex discrimination in the
workplace).
119. See SURVEY OF EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES, supra note 112, at 3, 9 (reporting
that of all the companies surveyed, only 471,562 of them (19.1%) currently employ
individuals with disabilities and only 8.7% hired a person with a disability within the
past 12 months).
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applicants without a disability.120 The ADA does not explicitly require
affirmative action, but it does require an employer to accommodate an
employee where it would not impose undue hardship.121 Requiring more
than the mere showing that a seniority system exists to defeat a requested
reassignment undermines the value of investing in the system, thereby
defeating the functionality of the system for predicting one’s status as an
applicant.122 In contrast, a best-qualified system does not grant an applicant
the ability to determine her standing in reference to other applicants, and
would not be disrupted such that its function is nullified.123 Courts have
rejected the generalized argument that the circumvention of any neutral
policy will erode an employer’s ability to set standards and other workplace
policies because the ADA already requires that the employer relinquish that
power in some instances.124
The Title VII framework permits claims for reverse race
discrimination.125 The protection of whites from racial discrimination was
derived from the legislative history and historical context from which the
Act was conceived.126 A similar claim alleging reverse disability
discrimination under the ADA would not be sustainable given the language
of the statute, which strictly precludes a claim of action by a person without
a disability.127 Therefore, an employer may not allege that reassignment,
which provides preferential treatment to an employee with a disability,
120. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 617-18 (highlighting the fact that the agency’s
diversity plan did not establish a quota based solely on applicants’ sex).
121. See Shapiro v. Twp. of Lakewood, 292 F.3d 356, 359, 361 (3d Cir. 2002)
(explaining the burden of the individual seeking reassignment).
122. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 392 (2002) (stating that
employee benefits earned through investment into the system would be undermined if
courts require more than the mere showing that a seniority system exists).
123. See Hager, supra note 87, at 2092 (arguing that best-qualified systems do not
provide applicants with predictability regarding employment issues such as hiring,
firing, and advancement).
124. See Ward v. Mass. Health Res. Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2000)
(interpreting the ADA to require employers to allow modification of “some” rules and
conditions).
125. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976)
(stating that Title VII prohibits race discrimination against any individual, including
whites; noting that the EEOC interprets the statute to protect all races).
126. See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 194
(1979) (noting that a practice may not be within the letter of the law or the intention of
Congress but may still be allowed or prohibited within its provisions).
127. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (2008)
(establishing that unlike Title VII, the ADA does not support a cause of action for
reverse discrimination for applicants without a disability or employees who may feel
they were unjustly discriminated against).
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would impose an undue hardship by making her liable for reverse
discrimination lawsuits under the ADA.128
F. Jurisprudence Supports a Finding that, Reassignment Trumps a
Company’s Best-Qualified Hiring Policy, Is Ordinarily Reasonable.
The Supreme Court’s recognition that it is necessary to give preference
to employees with a disability in order to accomplish the ADA’s
objectives, along with its limitation of employers’ duties under ADA
reassignment, achieves a sufficient compromise between both parties’
interests.129 Reassignment that circumvents an existing best-qualified
policy would not upset Congress’ and the Court’s balancing of employee
rights and employer obligations.130 The courts have carefully limited the
ADA from infringing upon important employee and employer rights.131 In
the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, courts have protected the rights of
employers to control the composition of their staff by limiting the
preferential treatment afforded to individuals seeking reassignment under
the ADA.132 One of the most influential restrictions on employers’ ADA
obligations, introduced by the Seventh Circuit, found that employers are
not obligated to provide an individual’s specific accommodation request,
only a reasonable request considering the specific circumstances of the
reassignment.133 Courts have relied on the statute’s language and
congressional intent to draw ADA reassignment parameters; requests for
128. See generally id. (precluding a claim of hardship by exposure to litigation
given that the statute does not provide for a claim of reverse disability discrimination);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2008).
129. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (stating that the
ADA requires preferences); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir.
1996) (explaining that requiring employees with a disability to meet specific criteria for
reassignment limits employers obligations).
130. See Cheryl L. Anderson, “Neutral” Employer Policies and the ADA: The
Implications of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L.
REV. 1, 9-10 (2002) (commenting that the scope of ADA reassignment is sufficiently
restricted).
131. See, e.g., Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir.
2000) (rejecting the notion that promotions are required); Still v. Freeport-McMoran,
Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 53 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that employers are not required to create
new jobs); Gile, 95 F.3d at 499 (holding that the ADA does not require employers to
bump others).
132. See Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1019 (holding that requiring employers to bump
employees, create new positions, and promote people requesting reassignment
constitutes undue hardship); Still, 120 F.3d at 53; Gile, 95 F.3d at 499.
133. See Schmidt v. Methodist Hosp. of Ind., Inc., 89 F.3d 342, 344 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the ADA does not require an employer to acquiesce to employees’ every
request).
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reassignment that go beyond these limitations have been rejected on the
ground that they impose undue hardship.134
Furthermore, the rigidity of seniority systems contrasts directly with the
malleability of a best-qualified system, thereby creating varied
expectations.135 By contrast, a best-qualified system leaves room for
managerial discretion that may ordinarily provide bases for imposing
reassignment over the hiring of the supposedly more qualified individual.136
Although the employers must present objective skills and requirements for
employment, the employer’s preference for one quality over another, such
as selecting an applicant with more experience rather than education in a
particular field, would still be discretionary.137
G. Courts Are Likely to Misapply Barnett’s Two-Step Analysis Unless the
Supreme Court Clarifies the Reassignment Requirement in Light of BestQualified Hiring Policies.
For the ADA to provide adequate protection to individuals with a
disability, preference is necessary.138 The Supreme Court’s finding that
reassignment that subordinates seniority systems is ordinarily unreasonable
overshadows its endorsement of a fact-specific analysis of the employee’s
accommodation request, resulting in other courts misconstruing its
reasoning.139 A Supreme Court finding that mandatory ADA reassignment
in circumvention of a best-qualified hiring policy is ordinarily reasonable
would clarify employers’ duties, employees’ rights, and the parties’ legal
burdens of proof whenever a conflict between the two arises.140 Employees

134. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 392 (stating that Congress did not intend to override
legitimate expectations in seniority systems).
135. See Anderson, supra note 130, at 27 (commenting that the difficulty in
meeting ADA goals in conflict with a seniority system lies with the absence of
exceptions to the plan, the stability, and the presence of contractual expectations).
136. See Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(finding that a court may not supersede an employer’s judgment when considering
hiring employees).
137. See Pettaway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 232 (5th Cir. 1974)
(stating that a claim that an employer or union selected or promoted the best-qualified
person is not valid until it demonstrates that it used objective criteria particular to the
job).
138. See Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation
Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 456 (2002)
(opining that the ADA’s text, history, and purpose suggests preferential treatment is
proper).
139. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397 (explaining that all accommodations require
specific preferential treatment).
140. See Atkins, supra note 1 (stating that businesses are urging the Court to define
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who are eligible for reassignment under the ADA would not suffer the
eventual loss of their jobs or decreases in pay because their disability
renders them incapable of performing the basic functions of their current
position.141 Lower courts will apply a consistent and predictable standard
when considering the parties’ duty to show that the reassignment is or is
not reasonable.142 While some practitioners hope that the Eighth Circuit
will eventually change its opinion and resolve the split, the practical
implications of the statute’s ambiguity deserve a swifter decision.143 The
Eighth Circuit is unlikely to change its opinion of the ADA’s effect on
neutral employment systems, given that it claimed to have already
considered Barnett’s rationale in Huber, and interpreted it to bolster the
Court’s current position.144 In addition, the goals of the ADA are
accomplished because individuals with a disability remain active
participants in the country’s workforce.145
Although the Barnett Court establishes a specific burden of proof for an
employee seeking reassignment under the ADA, other courts have used its
characterization of a seniority policy to heighten the employee’s burden
when seeking reassignment that circumvents a non-discriminatory
policy.146 Instead of evaluating the reasonableness of the employee’s
request and then the employer’s claim of undue hardship, the Haynes court
places upon the employee the responsibility to prove reasonableness and
disprove undue hardship before the employer establishes undue hardship

their obligations).
141. See Crabill v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 423 Fed. Appx. 314, 324
(4th Cir. 2011) (finding that a jury could determine that the employer’s failure to
reassign her prompted her early retirement); see also Befort, supra note 138, at 469
(commenting that because reassignment is a last resort accommodation, it is the
employee’s last hope to remain employed at their company).
142. See Befort, supra note 138, at 449 (emphasizing the difficulty federal courts
experience as a result of the current lack of clear reassignment standards).
143. See Justices Decline to Review ADA Case on Reassignment as Reasonable
Accommodation, EMPLOYERS GROUP (2013), http://www.employersgroup.com/
Content.aspx?id=2329 [hereinafter EMPLOYERS GROUP] (stating that Supreme Court
review is unwarranted because the Eighth Circuit may reconsider its position in light of
United Airlines).
144. See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating
that Barnett supports its reading).
145. See Stone v. Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1997) (commenting that
another equally important ADA goal is to minimize the societal costs of dependency of
individuals with a disability, thereby increasing productivity).
146. See Anderson, supra note 130, at 21 (stating that the Court essentially created
a rebuttable presumption for individuals seeking reassignment where reassignment
trumps seniority policies).
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simply because there is a non-discriminatory policy in place.147 This
requirement conflates the two-step analysis introduced in Barnett into one
elevated burden thrust upon the employee.148 However, as the Court in
Barnett demonstrates, the existence of a non-discriminatory policy is only a
factor in a totality of the circumstances analysis of the employer’s undue
hardship.149 There is no rebuttable presumption that reassignment that
circumvents best-qualified hiring policies is unreasonable.150 The Tenth
Circuit directly rejects requiring the employee to simultaneously prove that
the reassignment is reasonable and that the employee is the best-qualified
candidate.151 Because of the circuit split, the Haynes court rejected the
employee’s reliance on one side’s interpretation of the ADA’s
reassignment duty.152
IV. POLICY
Non-competitive reassignment under the ADA should trump bestqualified hiring policies because doing so furthers the goals of the statute,
alleviates practical difficulties of employing individuals with a disability,
and is not unduly burdensome to employers.153 Ten years after its
147. See Haynes v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:09-CV-450, 2011 WL 532218, at
*4-5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2011) (finding that Haynes may only avoid summary judgment
against him by showing that his reassignment is reasonable over the most qualified
applicant, a duty not required by the ADA).
148. See id. at *4 (finding the employee’s reassignment request unreasonable unless
he proved that it justified violating the best-qualified hiring policy). But see Anderson,
supra note 130, at 4 (arguing that requiring employees to justify why reassignment
trumps a non-discriminatory policy creates a presumption of undue hardship that
increases the plaintiff’s initial burden to show a reasonable accommodation).
149. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002) (explaining that
once the employee shows that reassignment is feasible, an employer must then show
case-specific undue hardship).
150. Compare Anderson, supra note 130, at 21 (stating that the Court created a
rebuttable presumption that violating seniority systems is unreasonable), with EEOC v.
United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734
(2013) (explaining that the presumption in Barnett was a narrow exception that should
not overshadow the two-step analysis).
151. See Smith v. Midland Bank, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1169 (10th Cir. 1999)
(dismissing the increased burden as unwarranted by the ADA’s language or legislative
history).
152. See Haynes, 2011 WL 532218, at *4 n.8 (rejecting the plaintiff’s reliance on
the authority of one side of the split).
153. See SURVEY OF EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES, supra note 112, at 4-5 (noting
companies’ inability to find qualified workers with a disability and the need to educate
the private sector to accurately assess the burdens of employing individuals with a
disability).
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enactment, the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement continued
to perplex employers, employees, and their counsel; today, the statute
remains just as unworkable as it was then.154 If reassignment, a last resort
effort to retain the employee, is presumed unreasonable in light of a bestqualified hiring policy, many employees with a disability are likely to
become unemployed and dependent.155 An employer’s imposition of a
best-qualified hiring policy over the ADA’s reassignment obligation may
often result in a constructive firing or demotion of individuals with a
disability similar to the fictional St. Louis employee from the earlier
hypothetical.156 Congress expressly sought to combat this problem through
the ADA.157 Clarification is even more urgent now given recent and future
growth of the population of individuals with a disability.158 Not only will
the influx of aging Baby Boomers affect the size of the community of
people with disabilities, recent amendments to the ADA have magnified the
implications of the statute’s ambiguities.159
To ensure the equal administration of the law, Supreme Court guidance
is necessary when employers and employees are faced with varying
interpretations of the ADA.160 Given that large companies are more likely
to employ people with disabilities, those that may operate simultaneously
in conflicting Circuit Court jurisdictions need a bright-line rule that clearly
defines the companies’ obligations.161 By addressing the issue and
154. See, e.g., Atkins, supra note 1 (commenting that the ADA’s requirements are
unclear and employers must tread lightly to ensure compliance); Fuller, supra note 30,
at 25 (stating that, in the year 2000, that the ADA remained a complex statute to
interpret, utilize, and follow).
155. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2009)
(lamenting the billions of dollars in costs the United States incurs from the dependency
and non-productivity of individuals with a disability as a result of widespread
discrimination).
156. See infra Part I.
157. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 345 (stating that reassignment prevents unemployment and the employer’s loss of
a qualified worker).
158. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, OFF. OF DISABILITY EMP’T POL’Y, CHANGING
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS THAT AFFECT THE WORKPLACE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES VOLUME I: LITERATURE REVIEW AND GAPS ANALYSIS, 29 (2009)
[hereinafter CHANGING DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS] (predicting that the aging Baby
Boomer generation will impact the population of individuals with disabilities).
159. See id. at 3 (stating that the incidence of disability is directly correlated to age
and will likely increase); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (2014) (stating that the purpose of
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 is to expand ADA coverage).
160. See Lavin, supra note 9, at 4 (opining that Supreme Court guidance would
provide a greater degree of certainty when considering reassignment).
161. See SURVEY OF EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES, supra note 111, at 2 (reporting that
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developing a rule that furthers ADA goals, and allows predictability to all
interested parties, the Supreme Court achieves other goals that Congress
sought to accomplish when enacting the ADA.162
A survey conducted by the Department of Labor highlights key concerns
and practical challenges of employing individuals with a disability.163
Delineated interpretations of the ADA reassignment duty are most
problematic where they affect large companies; such companies have more
employment opportunities for individuals with a disability but also are
most likely to operate in conflicting jurisdictions.164 Retention of a
qualified employee with a disability helps combat one of the greatest
challenges large companies face when recruiting individuals with a
disability.165
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should have found that equal administration of
justice under the ADA demands review, and granted certiorari in EEOC v.
United Airlines as it did in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.166 The Court
should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the ADA, mandating
non-competitive reassignment of eligible individuals with a disability as a
reasonable accommodation.167 Further, the Supreme Court should find that
reassignment that contravenes a company’s best-qualified policy does not
infringe employer or employee interests such that it would ordinarily

33.8% of companies with 250 or more employees recruit people with disabilities and
53.1% employ them).
162. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2009)
(stating that Congress intended to address disability discrimination by providing
“clear” and “consistent” enforceable standards under the ADA).
163. See SURVEY OF EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES, supra note 112, at 6 (stating the
purpose of the survey was to understand employer perspectives about employing
individuals with a disability to increase employment opportunities and influence
developing policy).
164. See id. at 9 (finding that companies with a larger workforce are more likely to
diversify their workforce by hiring individuals with disabilities).
165. See id. at 4 (explaining that large companies consider the difficulty of finding
qualified people with disabilities as their number one challenge).
166. See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 742 (2007) (granting
petitioner’s writ of certiorari, limited to the question regarding the extent of the
respondent’s ADA obligation).
167. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (agreeing with the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia and the Tenth Circuit that the ADA requires employers to appoint employees
with a disability to vacant positions).
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constitute undue hardship on the employer.168 Employers with a bestqualified hiring system do not provide a calculable measure of earned
benefits, but often use subjective criteria.169 Additionally, because a
uniform interpretation of the ADA will ensure the efficiency of the statute,
and clarify employer’s obligations in all jurisdictions, the Court should find
that non-competitive reassignment is required.170 A Supreme Court
decision in congruence with the Seventh Circuit will eliminate disparate
treatment of individuals with a disability such as those in the hypothetical,
and provide the assistance that Congress intended for a growing population
of people with disabilities.171

168. See id. (holding that deviation from a best-qualified hiring system does not
always create the same undue hardship as deviation from a seniority system).
169. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 n.17 (1987) (noting the
subjectivity of determining the best-qualified applicant).
170. See Lavin, supra note 9, at 4 (affirming that because of the continued split, the
issue must be addressed again to clarify employers’ ADA duties).
171. See CHANGING DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, supra note 158, at 3 (predicting that
disability rates will dramatically increase over the next forty years).
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